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Abstract
The purpose of this study is to illustrate, with a simple two-
country, two-good, two-factor model, how a technological/regulational
improvement in one country’s distribution sector can affect firms’ lo-
cation decisions and the nature of the trading equilibrium. It is shown
that, through improvements in distribution sector, one country might
divert high-tech industries to another country. This effect reduces the
incentive to improve distribution sector lower.
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1 Introduction
In the last decade the role of distribution sector in the global economy such as
wholesale and retailing networks and storage has been widely discussed.1 It is
increasingly recognized that trade and transport services within the borders
of trading countries impose international trade barriers.2 According to this
point, Rousslang and To (1993) point out that costs of domestic wholesaling
and retailing services can act as natural trade barriers in the same manner as
international transportation costs and estimate the barriers that such costs
impose against U. S. imports.
Related to this, several studies emphasize the role of distribution costs as
a determinant of trade patterns. Based on Ricardian trade setting, Bandy-
opadhay (1998) analyzes the effect of the distribution sector’s technological
progress on trade patterns. Also, based on Ricardian framework, Yano and
Dei (2003) focus on the vertical production chain in which tradable middle
products produced upstream and transformed into nontradable final con-
sumption goods downstream: they show how the suppression of competi-
tion in one country’s downstream sector affect trade patterns. Furthermore,
based on “new economic geography” trade model, Martin and Rogers (1995)
study the impact of improvement of the quality of local infrastructure. How-
ever, previous studies do note distinguish between “distribution costs for
imported products” and “distribution costs for domestically produced prod-
ucts”: an improvement in distribution’s sector implies a symmetric reduction
in transaction costs for both imports and domestically produced products.
This assumption is justified for simplification. However, distribution sector’s
improvement often cause asymmetric reductions in transaction costs. These
cases imply that imports require more domestic distribution services than lo-
cally produced products.3 In other worlds, domestic distribution sector play
a much greater role in insulating domestic producers from import competi-
tion than was previously recognized. This seems to suggest that the focus on
an improvement in the quality of distribution sector should be accompanied
by a focus on its “international trade barrier” nature.
1See, for example, Limao and Venables (2001) and World Bank (2004).
2See, for example, Wakasugi (2002).
3For example, since it take time to transport products from one country to another,
wholesalers and retailers may have to maintain high inventory levels to ensure uninter-
rupted supply in the domestic market. Bandyopadhyay (1998) notes these possibilities.
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To take this into consideration, in this study, we focus on the effect of an
improvement in the distribution sector which is in favor of importing activ-
ities. The purpose of this study is to illustrate, with a simple two-country,
two-good (homogeneous good/differentiated high-tech products), two-factor
(labor/capital) model, how a technological/regulational improvement in one
country’s distribution sector can affect firms’ location decisions and the na-
ture of the trading equilibrium.
Section 2 presents the model. Section 3 analyzes the impact of an im-
provement in the quality of distribution sector on industrial location.
2 The Model
Suppose that there are two country (Country 1 and Country 2), each with
two factors (capital, K and labor, L) and two types of goods (a homogeneous
good and a large variety of differentiated high-tech products).4 Assume that
the countries are identical in regard to tastes, size, and technology, but differ
with respect distribution costs on differentiated high-tech products, to which
we assume those costs as directly related to the quality of their distribution
sectors.
Consumers have Cobb-Douglas preferences over both categories and spend
fraction µ of their income on high-tech products. Country i’s price index for
high-tech products is represented by the Dixit-Stiglitz form:
Pi =
[
ni(pi)
1−σ + nj(tItipj)
1−σ]1/(1−σ), σ > 1 (1)
where σ is the degree of substitution among all products, pi is the producer
prices of high-tech products produced in Country i, and ni is the number
of varieties produced in Country i, respectively. Trade costs consists of two
parts: tI (tI > 1) represents the ‘iceberg’ international trade costs, which
is common for two countries. Domestic distribution costs ti (ti > 1) for
the imported high-tech products are also in the form of ‘iceberg costs’ and
country-specific. Note that, for simplicity, we assume that the distribution
costs for domestically produced products are zero. This assumption intends
to capture the situation that more of distribution services are needed when
4The model is a variant of Kikuchi (2005).
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the producer and consumer are not in the same country.5 We assume these
domestic distribution costs ti as directly related to the quality of Country i’s
distribution sector: changes in these costs represent changes in its quality.
Importing one unit of high-tech product variety for Country 1, tIt1 units
of products must be shipped from Country 2. Thus, the demands of con-
sumers in Country i for a Country i (i.e., local) variety and a Country j (i.e.,
imported) variety are
cii = p
−σ
i P
σ−1
i µEi, (2)
cij = (tItipi)
−σP σ−1i µEi, (3)
where Ei is the total income in Country i.
The homogeneous good is produced with constant returns, using only
labor as an input. Units are chosen so that one unit of labor produces one
unit of output. As usual in new geography models, no transport costs exist for
the homogeneous good, which serves to tie down the wage rate. Also assume
that the parameters of the model are such that both countries produce the
homogeneous good; thus, constant, identical wages for labor hold (hereafter
set to unity).
The production of each variety of high-tech product requires one unit of
capital to develop the product and β units of labor per unit of output. As
in Martin and Rogers (1995) and Martin and Ottaviano (1999), one of the
central assumptions is that the capital is firm specific, but it moves freely
between countries: if a variety developed by Country 1’s capital is produced
in Country 2, the operating profits are repatriated to Country 1. Given a
Dixit-Stiglitz specification with constant elasticity σ, each firm sets its price
as p1 = p2 = (βσ)/(σ − 1). By choice of units, one can set β = (σ − 1)/σ to
have
p1 = p2 = 1. (4)
Given that one unit of capital is required to develop a variety, the payment
for each unit of capital employed in Country i, ri, must satisfy,
ri = pixi − βxi = xi/σ, (5)
where xi is the output of a representative firm in Country i. When capital
mobility is unrestricted, the payment for capital will be equalized between
5Rousslang and To (1993) point this out.
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countries, which implies that r1 = r2 and thus
x1 = x2. (6)
3 Distribution Costs and Industrial Location
Now consider the firms’ location decisions. The product market equilibrium
in Country i requires that supply equals demand for each variety: xi =
cii + tItjcji. Substituting (2), (3), and (4) into this condition and setting
µEi = µ(rK + L) = 1 yields the following equilibrium condition:
x1 =
1
n1 + τIτ1n2
+
τIτ2
τIτ2n1 + n2
, (7)
x2 =
τIτ1
n1 + τIτ1n2
+
1
τIτ2n1 + n2
, (8)
where τi ≡ t1−σi (τi ≤ 1) measures the freeness of domestic distribution for
imports, which directly related to the quality of Country i’s distribution
sector. Also, τI ≡ t1−σI (τI ≤ 1) measures the freedom of international trade.
Using (5), (6) and (7), the equilibrium share of Country 1 firms, s1 can
be obtained:
s1 ≡ n1
n1 + n2
=
1
2
[
1− τI(τ1 − τ2)
(1− τIτ1)(1− τIτ2)
]
, (∂s1/∂τ1) < 0. (9)
Equation (9) implies the surprising feature of distribution costs.
Proposition: An improvement in the quality of distribution sector in a coun-
try will induce a diversion of high-tech products away from that country.
Now, let us explain the impact of the improvement in the quality of
Country 1’s distribution sector (i.e., τ1 increases) more precisely. This change
induces two effects. First, it shifts demand curves for Country 1’s varieties
downward: a lower distribution costs implies an increase in the effective
number of imported variety, τIτ1n2, which leads to a fall in local demand for
locally produced varieties in Country 1 (see equation (7)). Second, it shifts
demand curves for Country 2’s varieties upward: an easier access to Country
1 market increases the advantage of locating in Country 2 (see equation (8)).
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The above two effects reinforce each other and induce high-tech firms’ (i.e.,
capital) outwards flow from Country 1. It is also important to note that
lower international trade costs (i.e., a higher τI) raise the magnitude of this
outward flow.
This result has important policy implications for national economies. Im-
provements in one country’s distribution sector can divert firms in high-tech
industries over to another country. This lowers the incentive to improve the
quality of distribution sector. Although a higher quality of distribution sec-
tor reduces import transaction costs, it also induces industrial diversion and
might raises the transaction costs of receiving products from those indus-
tries that relocate elsewhere. The possibility that industries will be diverted
provides some theoritical grounds for the coordination of investment for dis-
tribution sectors among national economies. Further research should focus
on these policy implications.
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